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FEMINIST JUDGMENTS AND THE REWRITTEN PRICE 
WATERHOUSE 
Sandra Sperino* 
In theory, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment 
discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.1  In practice, 
American courts have distorted this ambition by creating a host of complicated 
frameworks through which they determine what counts as discrimination and what 
does not.  The Supreme Court has, at times, restricted the reach of discrimination 
law by interpreting Title VII narrowly.  However, even many ostensibly 
proemployee cases have contributed to the analytical chaos of discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
In Feminist Judgments,2 Professor Martha Chamallas reimagines the canonical 
case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.3  In that case, the Supreme Court recognized 
that a plaintiff can prevail on a Title VII claim by showing that a protected trait was 
a motivating factor in a negative employment outcome.4  In that case, the Court noted 
that plaintiffs in discrimination cases should not be required to prove but-for cause 
to prevail.5 
The introduction to the Professor Chamallas concurrence correctly notes many 
of the rewritten opinion’s strengths.  Professor Chamallas provides richer detail 
about the facts underlying the case and the context in which Price Waterhouse made 
its decision.  She embraces an enhanced role for experts to assist the courts in how 
discrimination occurs.  Professor Chamallas also explicitly recognizes that bias may 
occur even when a particular decisionmaker does not express overt bias.  However, 
there are many more contributions that are worth mentioning. 
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 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
 2 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS]. 
 3 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 4 Id. at 244–45. 
 5 Id. at 244 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 262–63 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring). 
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Professor Chamallas improves on the original Price Waterhouse by focusing 
not only on the comments of the decisionmakers, but also on the role the employer 
itself played in the outcome.  The Price Waterhouse opinion itself focused largely 
on the comments of the decisionmakers and did not emphasize the fairly 
unstructured partnership selection process and the fact that people who made biased 
comments about women were allowed to participate in partnership selection.  As 
Professor Chamallas notes, the selection process could have been less prone to bias 
if the employer had taken steps such as “monitoring and structuring discretionary 
decisions to focus on job-related criteria, skills and performance.”6 
Professor Chamallas also explicitly describes the limits of the McDonnell 
Douglas proof structure and rejected current doctrine, which tries to divide claims 
into so-called single-motive and mixed-motive frameworks.  She points out that 
Price Waterhouse itself could be a single-motive case, if the supposedly legitimate 
criticism of Ann Hopkins reflected sex-based stereotypes.  As Professor Chamallas 
correctly notes, “we should not attempt to tightly constrain the methods of proof or 
arguments plaintiffs offer in future cases.”7 
Professor Chamallas also avoids the trap of declaring the case as one that falls 
within the label of an intentional disparate treatment claim.  Title VII has two main 
operative provisions: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2).  Without much discussion, 
the courts have viewed the first provision as an intentional discrimination provision 
and the second as one that governs disparate impact.8  This dichotomy is court 
created and is not driven by the text of the statute.  In Price Waterhouse, the plurality 
unnecessarily reified this dichotomy by focusing on the language in subsection 
(a)(1), the so-called disparate treatment provision.  Almost all discrimination 
jurisprudence has focused on subsection (a)(1), leaving the full breadth of the 
statute’s reach untapped, even more than fifty years after Congress enacted Title VII.  
The (a)(2) provision prohibits additional discriminatory conduct, including limiting 
employees in any way that would “deprive or tend to deprive” them of employment 
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect [their] status as an employee” because 
of a protected trait.9  Professor Chamallas avoids unnecessarily separating the two 
provisions.  It is a subtle, but important, nuance.  When Professor Chamallas cites 
to Title VII, she cites to the entire statute. 
Professor Chamallas also soundly rejects the idea that Title VII jurisprudence 
should indiscriminately borrow from tort law.  Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse suggested, without support, that Title VII was a 
“statutory employment ‘tort.’”10  This reference has created undue havoc in 
discrimination law, as the Supreme Court has recently started to interpret the text of 
both Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) through 
 
 6 Martha Chamallas, Rewritten Opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 345, 359. 
 7 Id. at 356. 
 8 See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.2 (1999); see also Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977). 
 9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
 10 490 U.S. at 264 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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tort law.11  As the Professor Chamallas concurrence properly pointed out, Congress 
enacted Title VII in part because tort law and the common law idea of at-will 
employment inadequately protected workers.  She rightfully claimed Title VII as a 
“distinctive body of public law that aims to eliminate longstanding patterns of 
segregation, stratification, and lack of equal opportunity.”12
 
 11 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524−25 (2013); Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176−77 (2009). 
 12 Chamallas, supra note 6, at 349–50. 
